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T he diagnostic entity of schizophrenia creates a loose boundary around a heterogeneous collection of interrelated and relatively distinct phenotypes. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)-V planning process is currently under way and it has once again ignited the debate about the boundaries of this diagnosis. One question concerns whether psychotic symptoms can occur in healthy people.
A recent quantitative review of all reported incidence and prevalence studies of population rates of subclinical psychotic experiences revealed a median prevalence rate of around 5% and a median incidence rate of around 3%. 1 Many people who hear voices can cope with them and even view them as a positive part of their lives. I remember one of my own patients who had been hallucinating for 25 years. The month after I prescribed clozapine, he began to complain about the absence of auditory hallucinations. He was feeling lonely, bored, and sad. I decided to decrease the dosage of clozapine so he could hear his voices momentarily during the day. This clinical situation was new to me because it encouraged me, for the first time, to let the voices resurface gradually to increase my patient's quality of life, instead of trying to eradicate them. This prompted me to review literature and make connections with groups of people who consider that hearing voices is not automatically something negative but may actually be positive.
In a more personal and provocative book entitled Is It Normal to be Psychotic?, 2 I described subjective experiences and discussions with colleagues concerning these dimensional aspects of psychosis. For instance, in the case of psychoticlike symptoms during an exposure to cannabis in a nonpatient, what makes a person experience psychotic symptoms? One hypothesis is that individual differences may reflect a genetic psychotic vulnerability (for example, for carriers of the valine allele of the COMT Va1158Met polymorphism i 3, 4 ) so that cannabis use may have no adverse influence on people with 2 copies of the methionine allele.
Given that psychosis results from the interaction of many genes, it could be a continuous phenotype with mild forms present in the general population. Currently, 114 combinations of symptoms can lead to establishing the DSM-IV definition of schizophrenia, and different populations of patients are defined by different diagnostic systems (that is, DSM-III-R, DSM-IV, International Classification of Diseases, 10th edition, and Research Diagnostic Criteria). This raises questions about the validity of the current definition.
Some clinicians lean toward a categorical approach, whereas others consider psychosis a dimensional phenomenon. In the 2 following In Review articles, 5,6 the authors illustrate the debate between the dimensional and categorical approaches. In the first article, 5 Dr Genevieve Letourneau and I review the literature about what could be considered as psychotic phenomena in the healthy or nonclinical population. Having attended some European meetings and symposia organized by the International Network for Training, Education and Research into Hearing Voices, I observed that this phenomenon can be considered either as a purely pathological or as a completely normal phenomenon. On another occasion, during a meeting with several members of our team (nurses and doctors), I mentioned that I was writing an article on auditory hallucinations in healthy people. Surprisingly, 8 out of 10 members of the team admitted (in certain cases, with details) that they had heard voices at some point during their life. It did not prevent them from being health professionals, working in psychiatry, and, for the majority, taking charge of psychotic people suffering from auditory hallucinations.
This discussion reflected epidemiologic findings showing that nonclinical subjects can experience temporary or durable psychotic phenomena. Perhaps, when the auditory hallucination is pejorative or negative, it leads to an attitude where the phenomenon is recognized more frankly as pathological; however, when the contents are positive, it may be perceived as an integral part of the person. This principle underlines the importance of meta-cognition in the construction of a sign, a symptom, or a diagnosis. Given the relation between nonclinical psychotic symptoms and schizophrenia, minor psychotic symptoms in the general population are related to the same variables as is schizophrenia, so that psychosis, similar to obesity, represents one extreme of a distribution.
Dr Kieron O'
Connor's article 6 reviews cognitive accounts of hallucinations, delusions, and dissociations. He reminds us that it is crucial to distinguish the normality of these experiences from the cultural context making sense of them. He suggests that several cognitive dimensions of the self are relevant to the emergence of delusions.
It is possible to consider these 2 articles in the context of philosophical ideas about the normal and the pathological. In the words of Georges Canguilhem, "The disease of the normal person is the appearance of a fault in the biologic confidence in himself . . . The threat of the disease is one of the constituents of the health." 7, p 66 In the context of evidence-based medicine (EBM), psychiatry tends to examine clinical facts according to central values (means, averages, modes, medians) and of variance (or standard deviation). However, statistical norms are not the only measure we use when translating our knowledge into practice. To confer a diagnosis according to DSM-IV or another nosography is also a cultural process. Experience and understanding of psychotic symptoms are imbedded in a network of local meanings that vary from country to country, within different subcultural groups in a single nation, and over time (as communities undergo sociocultural changes).
The nosological paradigms developed to categorize different types of psychotic symptoms are also imbedded in specific professional cultures; these paradigms can change as professional cultures evolve. With worldwide migration increasing, it is crucial to develop a diagnostic system that will be useful across cultural minority groups. To do so, we need to know the relation between psychotic illness and minor psychotic symptoms in the general population, and determine the biological factors behind schizophrenic symptoms.
When we look closely at nosological categories in psychiatry, we discover a continuum. What is curious is in spite of our efforts at categorizing, treatment does not depend on categories. For example, the medications we use in psychiatry are less and less specific to any one diagnostic category. Antidepressants are prescribed in many other circumstances other than depression, as is the case with the antipsychotics, which are prescribed for various off-label indications (for example, sleep, anxiety, mood disorder, borderline traits, and craving).
Consider the example of a drug such as quetiapine. This medication, which works well in schizophrenia for treating psychotic features and (or) blunted affect, 8 has been studied in bipolar disorder as an add-on, antimanic product, then mood stabilizer, then antidepressant alone, as an anxiolytic in posttraumatic stress disorder, and an anticraving in general anxiety disorder. [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] This kind of so-called aspirin in psychiatry relativizes the need to categorize patients. If you can prescribe the same medication to 80% of the diagnoses contained in the DSM, according to the EBM results criteria, why do we need to establish a diagnosis?
In some ways, the language of psychiatry has created the boundary between madness and normality. The challenge today is to test whether our language is helpful in better understanding the dimensions of different models of psychosis: the emotional salience, the theory of mind, the attribution, the inner speech, the pruning, and psychosis proneness-persistence-impairment models, for example. The consequence for the clinicians is to know if there is a cut-off point where treatment becomes relevant. While some evidence suggests that a dimensional approach may be superior to a categorical approach (for clinical usefulness and prognostic ability), additional studies are needed to find which type of dimensional representation of schizophrenia would be most useful. We might even consider abandoning the diagnostic construct of schizophrenia and to invent a more modular illness concept that focuses on functions (cognitive, affective, and social) as opposed to categories.
